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Let us turn to the case at bar. Defendant got an instructed verdict. To
have made the plaintiff's case it was held necessary to infer first that Orey
• . . cranked the motor and in so doing injured himself. Now a prior
medical examination did not disclose that Orey suffered from a hernia, nor
did he complain of such a condition prior to the morning of the occurrence
of the injury. Moreover, the truck was stalled, starter stuck, and crank
inserted in the motor. An undertaker testified as to the presence of scratches
between Orey's abdomen and knees. Certainly this chain of circumstantial
facts is sufficient to base a reasonable inference opinion that there was a
relation between the circumstances and the injury, and had there not been
the dogmatic rule that an inference could not be based upon an inference,
it would have been but just to submit to the jury the case for its opinion.
And had it found that the injury did arise from cranking or attempting to
crank the motor, and did not occur through other means, it would have been
quite difficult to say that their verdict was an unmerited one.
W. E. 0.
TAXATIoN-ESTATE TAx:-GT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH.In 1927,
two years after making a will by which at death all his property was to be
transferred to a trust and the income paid to his daughter, deceased irrevocably
conveyed in trust nearly half this property. The deed of trust provided that
the income during his life should be added to the principal. After his death
the income was to be paid to his daughter during her life but no interest
therein should be anticipated until actual distribution. His stated purpose
was to transfer assets so that losses from future speculations could not affect
them and whatever happened to his financial affairs his daughter and her
heirs would be provided for. Taxpayer died in 1932 and Commissioner ruled
that the transfer was made "in contemplation of death". The Board of
Tax Appeals held that it was not1 but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
it.2 On appeal, held: Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
and decision of the Board of Tax Appeals approved. Colorado National
Bank of Denver v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1938), 59 S. Ct. 48.3
Transfers "made to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death" and transfers "made in contemplation of death" are taxed under nearly
all the state inheritance tax laws 4 and have been taxed under the federal
estate tax since the revenue act of 1916.5 Legislative bodies adopt these
measures to prevent avoidance of tax laws6 and the courts apply them
where the transfer was intended as a substitute for testamentary disposition.7
134 B. T. A. 1315. Memorandum opinion.
2 Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(C. C. A. 10th, 1938), 95 F. (2d) 160.
3Mr. Justice Black, dissenting (1938), 59 S. Ct. 48 at 49.
4 Bradford, Evolution of the Meaning of the Words "Gift Made in
Contemplation of Death" (1923), 9 Va. L. Rev. 267.
5 Sept. 8, 1916, c. 463, § 202 (b), 39 Stat. 777. For the present act see:
Feb. 26, 1926, c. 27, § 302 (c), 44 Stat. 70 as amended by March 3, 1931, c.
454, 46 Stat. 1516 and June 6, 1932, c. 209, § 803 (a), 47 Stat. 279; 26
U. S. C. A. §411 (c).
6 Helvering v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co. (1935), 296 U. S. 85, 56
S. Ct. 70.
7 Falck v. Holtegel (1937), 93 F. (2d) 512; "Contemplation of Death"
in Inheritance Taxation (1925), 34 Mich. L. Rev. 461. The jiustification for
RECENT CA4SE NOTES
As the state and federal courts have made similar definitions of transfers
"made in contemplation of death",8 it would appear that the same construc-
tion would be given to the other phrase. Under the present federal estate
tax, however, a transfer inter vivos, by which every vestige of ownership
has left the decedent prior to death, is not taxed as a transfer intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.9 And this is true
even though, as in the principal case, the intended beneficiary receives no
benefits from the gift until the donor's death.10 On the same facts and
same statutory language collection of the tax has been sustained under a
state inheritance tax.1 1 This result is reached because the estate tax is on
the privilege to transmit property by will or the laws of intestacy whereas
the inheritance tax is paid by the donee on the privilege of receiving benefits
at the death of the grantor even though the grantor made the transfer prior
to death.12 Under this state of the law the only problem before the court
in the principal case was whether the gift was taxable as being made "in
contemplation of death".
To be taxable as a gift made "in contemplation of death" the motive
which induces the transfer must be of the sort that leads to testamentary
disposition.13 "It cannot be said that the determinative motive is lacking
merely because of the absence of consciousness that death is imminent. It
is conceivable that the idea of death may possess the mind so as to furnish
a controlling motive for disposition of property although death is not thought
to be cloge".1 4 Deceased in the principal case provided for his daughter
only after his death. This is a factor but not a determinative one. 1 5  The
condition of decedent's body and mind and advanced age may be facts
indicating the motive was of the sort that leads to testamentary disposition
taxing some gifts inter vivos under estate taxes is their testamentary
character. The transfer is subjected to rates of taxation which do not relate
to the value of the gift but are determined by the value of a decedent's
property properly subjected to inheritance taxation. Kroeger, Inheritance Taxa-
tion of Transfers Not Taking Place at Death (1930), 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 113.
8 United States v. Wells (1931), 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446; Armstrong v.
State of Indiana (1919), 72 Ind. App. 303, 120 N. E. 717; Matter of Seaman
(1895), 14-7 N. Y. 69, 41 N. E. 401.
9 Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. (1929), 278 U. S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123;
May v. Heiner (1930), 281 U. S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 283. A 1932 amendment
to the estate tax includes as an item of the gross estate transfers where the
grantor reserves the income for life. June 6, 1932, c. 209, § 803 (a), 49
Stat. 279; 26 U. S. C. A. §411 (c). That a transfer reserving the income
to a third person for his life and a possibility that the property might revert
to grantor is not taxable see Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1935),
296 U. S. 39, 56 S. Ct. 74.
10 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Dunham (1934), 73 F. (2d) 752.
11 Saltonstall v. Saltonstall (1928), 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225.
12 Hill v. Nichols (1937), 18 F. (2d) 139.
13 Updike v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1937), 88 F. (2d) 807,
cert. den., 301 U. S. 708, 57 S. Ct. 942.
14 United States v. Wells (1931), 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446. After the
opinion in this case was written the lower federal courts have recited the
formula and attempted to apply it to fact situations. Willcutts v. StoIze
(1934) 73 F. (2d) 868; Internal Revenue Regulations 80 (1937 ed.) p. 51,
art. 16.
15 To so hold would mean that all transfers whereby benefits were received
after death would be "in contemplation of death".
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while a desire to be relieved of responsibility, a desire to discharge moral
obligations, or a purpose to carry out a previously adopted policy of making
gifts during his lifetime indicate a purpose predominately associated with
life.1 6
A review of the decisions indicates that the federal courts have been
extremely reluctant to hold that a gift inter vivos has been made "in con-
templation of death". In nearly all cases upholding the tax the court has
been aided by the statutory provision that gifts made within two years prior
to death are presumed to have been made "in contemplation of death".17
Where gifts made more than two years prior to death have been taxed, the
facts indicating a predominant motive associated with death have been very
clear' 8 or uncontested.19
The principal case held that there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the Board of Tax Appeals. While it is in accord with the
rules of law stated in prior decisions it shows that the reluctance of the lower
courts to hold gifts as being made "in contemplation of death" is shared to a
considerable extent by the nation's highest court. If it is desirable to tax all
transfers where the donee receives benefits only on the death of the donor
as part of his gross estate it appears that an amendment to the statute will
be required. 20  E. 0. C.
TAXATIoN-TAX STATUS OF WILL CONTESTANTS-INFLUENCE OF STATE LAW
ON THE INTERPRETATION OF FEDERAL TAX STATTEs.-Petitioner, the grandson
of testatrix, who bequeathed certain small legacies to her heirs and the entire
residuary estate to a trustee for an endowment trust for a charity, began a
will contest which ended in a compromise agreement. Suit was brought to
recover income tax, assessed on amount obtained by the compromise. Peti-
tioner contended that it was not income under the Sixteenth Amendment, and
if income under the amendment was exempt under the exemption of property
received by "inheritance." Held: that such property comes under exemption
of "inheritance." Lyeth v. Hoey (1938), 59 S. Ct. 155.
The Supreme Court after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment defined
taxable income as that "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
16 Updike v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1937), 88 F. (2d) 807;
United States v. Wells (1931), 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446.
17 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (c). The statutory presumption was overcome in
the Wells case because the motive was to carry out a policy long followed
of making liberal gifts to his children during his lifetime. 283 U. S. 102,
119; 51 S. Ct. 446. But where the donor transferred $670,000 in trust and
the same day disposed of the remaining $13,000 of his property by will the
Supreme Court held that being 78 years old, unusually vigorous and clear
minded, and in good health was not enough to overcome the presumption
and held that the estate was taxable. McCaughin v. Real Estate Land Title
and Trust Co. (1936), 197 U. S. 606, 56 S. Ct. 604.
18 Oliver v. Bell (1938), 23 F. Supp. 30. Deceased was 99 years, 11
months, 11 days old at his death. He had divided his property among his
children two and one-half years before and made his will two days later.
The same persons witnessed both the will and the gift instrument. The
same persons were beneficiaries and received the same proportions under
both instruments.
19 Milliken v. United States (1931), 283 U. S. 15, 51 S. Ct. 324.
20 Helvering v. Bullard (1938), 303 U. S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565, indicates
that such a classification would be valid.
